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ABSTRACT

The United States’ voter turnout is often cited as being disappointingly low.
Compulsory voting laws are offered as a possible solution to increase voter turnout and
overall political participation. Opponents of the law complain that voters affected will be
more politically liberal and in turn seek to enlarge the size and scope of the government.
In order to determine whether this is true, a test was run on the effect compulsory voting
laws have on the government revenue of 109 nations. The data held that no significant
relationship exists between the two variables observed. This paper will discuss
compulsory laws and the controversy surrounding them and also offer possible
explanations for why the predicted correlation was not found.
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INTRODUCTION

Few democracies in the world have a lower voter turnout than the United States.
America is ranked 139th out of 172, with an average of 48.3 percent of eligible voters
attending since 1945 (IDEA World Turnout, 2005). Whether these numbers are low or
disappointing, as is often said, is a normative question. Nevertheless, voting is an
important part of self-government and is by definition necessary for democracy. The
heart of the turnout debate is the question of whether voting is a citizen’s right or duty.
Around the world, nations that see it as a duty have passed compulsory voting laws as a
remedy for unsatisfactory turnout. Currently, there are 31 countries with some form of
compulsory law (IDEA Compulsory Voting, 2001). The severity of the laws range from
no enforcement whatsoever in countries like Italy and Netherlands to fines and permanent
disenfranchisement in Belgium and Luxemburg (IDEA Compulsory Voting, 2001).
The existences of these compulsory laws are not new, and in some countries have
been a way of life for almost 100 years (see Figure 1). According to the International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance it has been a part of Australian law
since 1924. Argentina has had the law on its books since 1912. But it is a rule that is
subject to change. Switzerland abolished the law in all but one canton in 1974 and
Venezuela has since abolished the law completely (IDEA Compulsory Voting, 2001).
To fully understand the laws, I believe it is valuable to understand the controversy
surrounding them. After I summarize the opinions on both sides, I will conduct a
literature review of three important papers. The first of these will discuss why
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compulsory voting might be needed and to what degree it could be beneficial in
increasing turnout. The next paper reviewed suggests that voter turnout increases are
more beneficial to leftwing parties. The final review will show that when poll taxes and
literacy tests were removed in the United States, an increase in poorer less educated
voters led to a growth in the size of the government. I will use the theories behind these
three papers to support the possibility of a liberal bias of compulsory voting laws. When
these are established, it leads to a poorer, less educated median voter, which is more
likely to want greater, more redistributive government spending. I will seek to examine
this criticism by measuring the effect that compulsory voting laws have on government
revenues as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product of 109 nations.

Figure 1: Timeline of the Adoption of Compulsory Voting Laws, from Endogenous
Institution by Helmke and Meguid.
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CONTROVERSY OF COMPULSORY VOTING

The heart of the controversy of compulsory voting law lies in the dispute over
voting as a right or as a duty. Those who believe that voting is the duty of all citizens,
cite the famous Congresswoman from Maine that “Freedom unexercised may become
freedom forfeited.” (Roosevelt, 2008). The votes of the people direct the government,
and without that direction, government will almost certainly stray from the public interest.
However, it is not only the amount of people that worry proponents of compulsory laws,
but also the composition of the voters themselves.
The composition of the voting population is worrisome because of the possible
impact it could have. Our representatives are elected and instructed based on votes. To
put it another way, politicians are “single-minded seekers of reelection” (Mayhew, 2004).
Their job is kept not necessarily by doing a good job, but by pleasing enough voters to
get reelected. Their attention is set on voters, not people. To put it bluntly, politicians
exchange political action, or inaction, for votes. Those that do not vote have little or no
influence over the actions of politicians. Consequently, proponents of compulsory voting
laws are concerned about the makeup of the electorate.
The voting population is not representative of the population as a whole. There
are huge turnout gaps between different segments of the public. In Great Britain’s last
general election, people ages 18 to 25 were half as likely to vote as their older
counterparts ages 65 and over (IPPR, 2006). The difference in turnout rooted in age has
great potential for harm. Problems with Social Security and Medicare have been difficult
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for politicians to resolve because of the overwhelming political pressure from the elderly.
In the same study, the Institute for Public Policy Research states that since the 1960’s the
turnout gap between the top quarter earners and the bottom quarter earners has almost
doubled. The disparity based on education level is just as substantial and can be seen
below:

Figure 2: from the Earl Carl Institute for Legal and Social Policy

These inequalities in voter turnout could impair some of the most vulnerable members of
society. The young, poor and uneducated are those most likely to be affected, and
possibly the most helped, by compulsory voting laws.
Another rationalization for the establishment of compulsory voting is that it frees
political parties from spending large sums of money on get out the vote campaigns.
Instead that money can be spent on informing voters on the issues and on the candidates.
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It could be beneficial to the political system if political parties spent more time
enlightening unsure voters and less time simply corralling the apathetic and uninformed.
The cost of voting is an important factor to understand when considering voter
behavior. In fact, the cost to voting is so high and the benefits low, it is may actually be
irrational to vote. When the total number of votes in an election are numbered in the
millions, a single vote has no impact. However, if enough citizens decide not to vote, the
voice of the people will not be heard. Low enough voter turnouts could lead to a small
minority controlling the government resulting in unpopular ruling.
Nevertheless one single voter cannot change this situation. This can lead to a free
rider problem. Since there are public benefits to have a minimal amount of turnout, some
may not vote in hopes that their fellow citizens will do it for them. They plan to benefit
from others voting without having to do it themselves. Then again this may not be such a
problem. As the number of people who vote decreases, the value of a single vote
increases. As the value of the vote increases, turnout increases. This may keep turnout
from becoming what some would deem inadequately low. As uncomfortable as
government enforced voting makes many people, it is important to note that governments
regularly asks citizens to do things against their will for the greater good. Paying taxes,
serving on juries, attend schools and conscription to fight in the defense of your country
are all examples of government coerced political activities.
There are many benefits cited in support of compulsory voting laws, but there is
also a lot opposition. Those that oppose the laws put forward many problems with the
compulsory voting system. The most basic of these contentions is the belief that voting is
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a right, not a duty. It was created to be a means through which ordinary citizens to make
their preferences heard. In a nation with compulsory laws, for many the civil right
becomes a requirement. Instead of a defense of democracy, it may be seen as an
infringement on individual’s liberties. The right to not vote could be as important as the
right to vote. By forcing citizens, you take away their freedom of expression in the form
of non-participation.
A different question to ask is what exactly a low turnout implies? Supporters of
compulsory laws maintain that a low voter turnout is harmful to the legitimacy of a state
and can imply large-scale distrust and discouragement from the political process (IDEA
Why, 2004). Conversely, opponents of mandatory voting laws argue that low voter
turnout signifies widespread contentment with government. The International Institute
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance refers to the example of Albania. In the 1990’s
Albania had three competitive elections, all with high voter turnout in the 90th percentile
(2004). The United States had a 47 percent turnout in the 1996 presidential election. In
the late 1990’s it was Albania, not the United States, which was devastated by national
riots resulting in the collapse of the federal governmental structure. Turnout alone is not
mandate enough.
Another major complaint of compulsory voting laws is that they only benefit
major political parties. The law frees parties from the difficulty of campaigning to
energize passive voters and these newly voting, but still uninformed voters tend towards
mainstream political parties (ACE, 1997). Those who would not vote under a voluntary
system are less likely to be informed enough to understand the platforms of minor parties.

6

Australian columnist Padraic McGuinness claims that both of the major parties in his
country support the current compulsory voting system because it “obliges their loyal
voters, however apathetic, to turn up to vote the party ticket” (1997).
Aside from the financial cost of enforcing these laws, the act of imposing them
put another burden on already active citizens. Australian lawyer Alan Anderson claims
that it is not voluntary voting that disenfranchises the unwilling, but instead compulsory
voting that disenfranchises the willing (2004). By coercively increasing the amount of
voters, the law marginalizes those who would vote regardless. Those citizens who vote
uninformed or worse that randomly mark their ballot as their form of participation are not
inconsequential. It is important to understand how these unacquainted voters cast their
ballot.
Whether random votes are based on ballot order, called a “donkey vote”, name
recognition, or truly unsystematically is of major concern to policy makers. Their hope is
that if the vote is truly random, then it should not unfairly benefit either side. However, it
is possible that even if the vote is not random, but is instead based on the preferences of
the voters, it may still be biased. What I seek to discern in the following sections is
whether one political ideology benefits from compulsory voting. Do those citizens who
would not normally vote lean towards one end of the political spectrum and if so, do they
affect the size and scope of the government?
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LITERATURE REVIEW

Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma
In this next section I will discuss a handful of journal articles that are relevant to
my research. In this first by Arend Lijphart, he gives two main reasons why low voter
turnout is a serious problem. There is a systematic class bias towards those that do not
vote. Lijphart affirms what I have previously discussed; that the more educated a citizen
is the more likely they are to vote (1997). The author says this is true not just for the
United States, but around the world. Lijphart asserts that the bias of turnout leads to a
bias of political influence. The higher classes of citizens vote more, and in turn have
more influence over election seeking politicians.
The second problem that Lijphart points out is that turnout is not only low in the
U.S., but also the world. He warns readers not to be deceived by facts that cite voter
turnout as a percentage of registered voters. Those numbers are highly misleading and do
not fully illustrate the problem. The turnout, the author says, is most frightening when
looking at local or midterm elections. In the United States, off-year turnout is closer to
35 percent and local elections as low as 25 percent (Lijphart, 1997). Although less
publicized, these second-order elections are certainly not irrelevant. It is not only the low
numbers that alarms the author, but their decline. Once at an average of 60 to 65 percent
in the 1950’s, U.S. voter attendance has decreased to 50 to 55 percent in the 1990’s
(Lijphart, 1997). While less substantial, the decline around the world is still considerable.
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The average turnout in 20 industrialized nations has declined from an average of 83
percent in the 1950’s to 78 percent in the 1990’s (Lijphart, 1997)
To combat what Lijphart deems as unsatisfactory turnout, he proposes two policy
changes. The first of these is to create more “voter-friendly” institutional changes that
maximize turnout. These proposals include “proportional representation, infrequent
elections, weekend voting, and holding less salient elections concurrently with the most
important national elections” (Lijphart, 1997). The other solution, he argues, is to make
voting mandatory through compulsory voting laws, the pros and cons of which we have
already discussed.
Lijphart goes into detail discussing the increases in turnout brought by the laws.
He notes that participation is higher on average in countries with compulsory voting than
in countries without it. In fact, as Lijphart cites, it has been found to raise turnout about
10 percent (Powell, 1980). Another study he points to gives a similar number of 7.3
percent difference (Franklin, 1996). Both of those studies support the claim that less
prominent elections benefit more from compulsory voting because of their low pre-law
turnout. Lijphart supposes that pre-law turnout rates have a significant influence over
post-law rates. Cited by Lijphart, Wolfgang Hirczy’s showed that the effects of the
Australian law were 9 times greater than those in Austria (1994). This is because of the
comparably low voter turnout of Australia before the introduction of the compulsory law.
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Turnout and the Vote for Left-of-Centre Parties: A Cross-National Analysis
This journal article written by Alexander Pacek and Benjamin Radcliff focuses on
the effect that an increase in turnout can have on leftist political parties. It is the author’s
speculation that increases in voter turnout directly benefits more liberal parties. Lower
class citizens, who are normally aligned with a liberal party, have lower and more
varying rate of political participation (Pacek, 1995). These peripheral voters are those
most likely to be the driving force behind increases or decreases in voter attendance.
Therefore, increases in voter turnout disproportionately benefit traditionally liberal
parties (Pacek, 1995). More directly, every percentage point increase in turnout, leads to
a greater proportion of voters for the left.
The authors measured the relationship between turnout and the liberal vote in 19
different industrialized nations. They began with a simple model: V=a + b (T) + e, where
V represents the total left-party vote, T is voter turnout, a is the intercept and e the error
term. They also included a dummy variable to account for differences in each country.
Using this model they confirmed the theoretical assumption that the turnout effects the
vote distribution. The researchers then added a class variable to measure the degree that
parties were aligned on a class basis. As predicted, parties more aligned with lower class
voters and the leftist ideology benefited more from increases in voter turnout.
The conclusions of Pacek and Radcliff’s paper were that changes in voter turnout
are largely due to changes in the voter turnout rates of the lower class. This results in the
support for these parties being tied to voter turnout. The more the party is aligned with
those interests, the more it is affected. This suggests that more liberal parties have an
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incentive to support institutional changes that lower the cost of voting. The connection
between turnout and liberal parties could also have other implications. There could be a
connection in the global ideological shift to the right and the global decreasing voter
turnout.

The Effect of the Expansion of the Voting Franchise on the Size of Government
The final article discusses the political results of increasing the voter franchise.
Written by Thomas Husted and Lawrence Kenny, this paper seeks to prove that the
elimination of the poll tax and literacy tests in the United States lead to increases in the
size and scope of the government. Those most affected by the decrease in voting barriers
were the poor and uneducated. This caused the median voter to be poorer. This new
voter block found redistribution more appealing and thus aligned themselves with big
government politicians (Husted, 1997).
The new poorer median voter may have supported increases in transfer payments,
but it is not so clear that they supported all liberal causes. As the author’s highlight, as
government welfare spending increases, so does the relative income of the nation’s
poorest (Husted, 1997). This increase in income, actually weans them away from public
consumption and towards the private kind. Consequently, the “expenditures on
government services rise only if the elasticity of substitution between government
services and private goods exceeds the income elasticity for government services”
(Husted, 1997).
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In order to discover if the increases in government welfare spending are due to
changes in the electorate, the authors used state and local spending and voter registration
data in the 46 states (excluding Alaska, Hawaii, Minnesota and Nebraska for lack of data)
from 1950 to 1988. This time period helps give perception on any effect that the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 and 1970 might have had. The South had a large increase in the
number of blacks registered after the barriers were lifted (Husted, 1997). There was an
increase from 24.9 percent in 1956 to 62 percent in 1968 of eligible black voters
registered (Husted, 1997).
Welfare spending doubled on average from 1964 to 1976 and then climbed
another 23 percent over the next decade (Husted, 1997). Using state spending data from
these dates the authors found an indirect effect of the eliminated barriers on government
welfare spending. According to Husted and Kenny as these obstacles were eliminated,
and poorer voters became more active, they voted in politicians that supported their
desire for government transfers (1997). This new group of special interest was able to
shift American policy in their favor. To put it in the author’s words: “the elimination of
poll taxes, a fall in the income of voters relative to that of the population, and a shift from
Republican control to Democratic control all lead to higher welfare spending” (1997).
However, this point should not be overstated. With welfare spending only 15 percent of
a normal state’s budget, the increase in that particular type of spending cannot account
for the sizeable increase in state government spending over the last 40 years (Husted,
1997).
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DATA AND SOURCES

The data for my regression was gathered from various databases of world
statistics. I collected information about 9 variables for my sample size of 109 countries.
Those that were excluded were done so solely for lack of accurate information. The
dependent variable of the regression is government tax revenue as a percent of Gross
Domestic Product. Tax revenue included compulsory transfers to the central government
for public purposes (NationMaster). Some transfers such as fines, penalties, and social
security contributions were excluded. The data for the variable was taken from
NationMaster, an online compilation of freely available global information. According to
their website, they accumulate their data from other sources such as the CIA Factbook,
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the United Nations.
In this case the information was taken from the World Development Indicators database.
The most recent year data was used, ranging from 1993 to 2005.
All of the compulsory law and voter turnout data came from The International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance site. It is an intergovernmental
organization whose mission is to “provide knowledge to democracy builders, provide
policy development and analysis, and support democratic reform” (IDEA Home). From
their records I retrieved the voter turnout and the degree of compulsory laws in each
country. Voter turnout was measured by taking all of the number of attendees to the
voting booth and dividing it by the voting age population. The voter turnout numbers are
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based on all national elections, both parliamentary and presidential, since 1945 (IDEA
Survey, 2008).
The compulsory law data was also found on the IDEA site. The researchers at the
IDEA not only designated who had these laws, but also formed their own measure of the
degree to which they enforced it. To measure the degree of enforcement they accounted
for permissible excuses to not vote, possibility of fines, imprisonment, or even the
possibility of future disenfranchisement. They then labeled each nation with either no
enforcement, weak enforcement, or strict enforcement. I then attributed a value to each.
If there was no law, I gave the country a 0. If they had the law but no enforcement I gave
them a value of .33. If they had the law with weak enforcement I gave it a value of .66.
And if they had strict enforcement of their compulsory voting laws the value was 1.
The population was taken from the CIA Factbook and is a measure taken by the
United States Census Bureau. It is based on the statistics from population censuses,
registration systems, or estimations based on sample surveys from the past (Factbook,
2008). The variable for GDP per capita was also found on the CIA Factbook. It shows
GDP on a purchasing power parity basis divided by population.
The sub-Saharan variable was taken from a list of countries labeled so by the
Canadian International Development Agency (2007). This variable was added based on
the speculation that many sub-Saharan nations have corrupt governments and corrupt
government regularly steal from their citizens via tax revenue. A value of one was given
if they were, and 0 if they were not. Similarly, the former Soviet Union dummy variables
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were given a 1 if they were and a 0 if they were not. That information was gathered from
a list on www.aneki.com, a popular lists site (2008).
The third and final dummy variable was the Islamic nation variable. Like the
others, a value of 1 was given if it was labeled as Islamic, and a value of 0 if it was not.
This was considered important because of the charitable focus on the poor in the Islamic
faith. My hypothesis was that more Islamic nations would have less need for government
wealth transfers to the poor. The task of how to label a nation Islamic was difficult, so I
used the member nations of Organization of the Islamic Conference. This group declares
that they are “collective voice of the Muslim world and ensuring to safeguard and protect
the interests of the Muslim world” (OIC About, 2008).
The last variable I included in my regression is the percentage of the population in
urban areas. This was taken from the United Nation’s Population Division site, using
2005 data. The UN defined the data as the population living in areas classified as urban
according to the criteria used by each country. The importance of this variable in
affecting government spending was the suspicion that large cities inherently have higher
taxes. Therefore, a country with a large proportion of their populace in cites, ceteris
paribus, will have higher taxes.
Finally I created an interaction variable by multiplying the voter turnout of each
nation with their degree of compulsory voting law. This is important in order to interpret
the variables correctly. To see the variables in even more detail we can look at Table 1,
the summary statistics of data.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Data
Variable

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

tax_revenue

109

18.73018

7.875715

.98

54.39

voter_turnout

109

65.27339

15.02286

29.8

96.1

compulsory_degree

109

.1429358

.2975931

0

1

population

109

39.12957

118.0978

.029973

1147.996

gdp_pc

109

15922.94

15487.35

500

80800

subsaharan_dummy

109

.1559633

.3644964

0

1

pop_urban

109

59.34771

22.49112

12.2

100

islamic_dummy

109

.2293578

.4223617

0

1

soviet_dummy

109

.0733945

.2619875

0

1

turnout_law

109

9.445055

20.5106

0

84.9

For a full description of each variable, see the appendix
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METHODS AND RESULTS

The primary test I ran was to see if there was a correlation between my dependent
variable, the percent of government tax revenue and my independent variable, the
existence and degree of any compulsory voting laws. I ran a simple ordinary least
squares regression using Stata 9.2 ™. It was in the following form:

tax_revenue = βº + β(compulsory_degree) + β(gdp_pc) + β(islamic_dummy) +
β(population) + β(pop_urban) + β(soviet_dummy) + β(subsaharan_dummy) +
β(voter_turnout) +β(voter_law) + e

I used a robust linear regression to account for any heteroscedasticity. The results of this
regression can be seen in Table 2:
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Table 2: Robust Regression of Tax Revenue
Linear Regression

Number of obs = 109
F(9, 99) = 8.04
Prob > F = 0.000
R-squared = 0.2568
Root MSE = 7.0914

Variable

Coef.

voter_turnout**

.1518162

Robust
Std. Err.
.0613648

compulsory_degree

-7.23070

8.58877

-0.84

0.402

-24.2726

9.811285

population**

-.010851

.004023

-2.70

0.008

-.018834

-.002868

gdp_pc

4.38e-06

.000064

0.07

0.946

-.000123

.0001319

subsaharandummy**

6.126356

2.89437

2.12

0.037

.3832802

11.86943

pop_urban

.0133638

.039465

0.34

0.736

-.064943

.091671

islamic_dummy*

-4.15665

2.21700

-1.87

0.064

soviet_dummy

-.741151

1.66112

-0.45

0.656

-4.03718

2.554881

turnout_law

.1093719

.118645

0.92

0.359

-.126045

.3447894

constant

8.435116

4.35701

1.94

0.056

-.210149

17.08038

*indicates significant at the 0.10 alpha level
**indicates significant at the 0.05 alpha level
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t

P > |t|

[95% conf. interval]

2.47

0.015

.0300552

.2735772

-8.55567

.2423709

As you can see, not all the variables are significant at the 5 percent level. As predicted
voter turnout, population and the sub-Saharan dummy and the Islamic dummy are all
significant. GDP per capita, percentage population urban and the Soviet dummy are all
not significant influences on government revenue. The most important independent
variable, compulsory voting law, is not significant. In the following section I will discuss
why I think this is so.
There are things these results can tell us. Voter turnout is positively correlated
with government revenue at the 5 percent level. To interpret the coefficient, for every 1
percent increase in voter turnout, there is a 0.15 percent increase in government spending
as a percentage of GDP. Population on the other hand is negatively correlated with
spending. For every 1 million more people, the tax revenue percentage decreases by .01
percent. This could suggest some kind of economies of scale in government production.
The sub-Saharan variable, as predicted, was positively correlated with government
spending. If a nation is labeled sub-Saharan, it will have at 6.1 percent more spending as
a percent of GDP. Finally, the Islamic dummy was also significant, but at the 10 percent
level. The coefficient suggests that if a country is labeled Islamic, then it will have 4.1
percent less spending percentage.
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ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

This next section will focus on why compulsory voting laws were not correlated
with government spending. The first reason is lack of useful data, the most of which is
international welfare spending. It would be beneficial to look at the composition of
government revenues, not just the total. A journal article reviewed earlier, The Effect of
the Expansion of the Voting Franchise on the Size of Government, showed an important
difference between welfare spending and overall spending. In this article the authors
conclude that government transfer payments did increase due to the disappearance of the
poll taxes and literacy test. However, what it did not suppose is that overall government
spending could be explained.
The government is not simply a supplier of unemployment and welfare checks.
That is only a small part of what it does. Those most likely to be affected by compulsory
voting laws, the poor and uneducated, would have a vested interest in transfer payments,
but not necessarily other kinds of government spending. With welfare making up only 9
percent of United States federal government spending, it follows that it may not show as
significant (US Spending, 2008).
There was a major problem in finding that data. The question of what defines
welfare? There is no even a clear consensus on how to measure welfare spending.
Would Social Security be included? How about subsidization of housing? Even more
problematic, what about money given to private groups such as religious and charitable
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organizations? A reliable measure of government welfare spending may possibly show
the correlation the critics predicted.
Another possible explanation for the results of the compulsory law variable is the
possibility that these compulsory laws’ main purpose were not initially to increase overall
political participation. Author of the book Australia's Democracy: A Short History, John
Hirst, is an ardent opponent of the Australian compulsory voting laws. In his article
published in The Age, an Australian newspaper, suggests that:

Compulsory voting was not introduced because Australians were losing interest in
voting. It was introduced in Queensland in 1914 when at the previous election 75
percent of adults had voted, the best turn-out at state elections at that time. The
Liberal government that introduced the measure faced almost certain defeat at the
election due in 1915, and Labor looked set to win a majority of seats for the first
time. Labor was better at getting its supporters to the polling booths because it
had thousands of campaign workers devoted to the cause. So the Liberals decided
to make its supporters turn out in equal force by making voting compulsory
(2002).

It was not to increase overall political participation, but instead to keep party control. If
this were also true in other countries, then one could make an interesting argument that
compulsory voting laws do not do a good job because they were not originally created to
do their job. The available information to corroborate Mr. Hirst’s claim is in small
supply, but it is not totally absent.
A paper by two political scientists from the University of Rochester suggests that
when politicians are deciding on whether or not to institute compulsory voting, they do so
with their own jobs in mind (Endogenous Institutions, 2007). The authors conclude that
compulsory voting laws offer politicians a useful tool to encourage their apathetic
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supporters to come to the polls when times become desperate. They show this by
demonstrating that parties in power are more apt to adopt compulsory voting laws if the
opposing party is relatively strengthening. It is the fear of expulsion from power that
encourages parties to adopt these laws (Endogenous Institutions, 2007).
The inability of these laws to be as effective as they could be is seen in their
ability to affect voter turnout. Of the 31 countries that have some form of compulsory
voting laws, only one, Italy, ranks in the top 10 in voter turnout (IDEA Turnout, 2001).
Moreover, there are only 6 in the top 50. The statistics cited earlier demonstrate that the
laws have an effect, but maybe not as much as predicted. See Figure 3 to see how they
compare when only counting only the most recent election cycle.

Figure 3: Difference in voter turnout (last election only) from The International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
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Although compulsory voting has a noticeable impact on voter registration, nations
with compulsory voting laws have only a small gain in actual voter turnout (IDEA
Turnout, 2001). Whether this is a result of poorly constructed laws with little or no
punishments created by self-interested politicians or possibly a result of the diminished
value of a single vote, the impact of the compulsory laws is not very noteworthy. This
lack of impact on turnout from the law could help explain why the strong correlation
between the laws and government spending was not found.
The final reason why a positive correlation between compulsory laws and
government spending was not found is that it may correlate in the opposite direction. An
article entitled The Right Versus The Obligation to Vote: Effects on Cross-Country
Government Growth stated that it is possible for compulsory voting to actually decrease
government spending (Crain and Leonard, 1993). According to the authors, if compulsory
voting is able to actually increase voter turnout, or at least rid it of its class bias, then the
possibility for transfers from non-voters to voters is less. The increase in the number of
participating citizens would decrease the opportunity for special interest groups to lobby the
government and in turn decrease the amount of money given to them. If government
spending is controlled by the demands of well organized special interest groups, not
unorganized regular voters, then these transfers are most likely damaging to the average
person. However, the tax burden is spread out over the entire taxpayer base, whereas the
benefits are centralized in the special interests. This accounts for why one is much more
organized and fervent in Washington and why many citizens rationally do not vote.
Alternatively, if more citizens are forced to vote, their power increases relative to those of the
pressure groups (Crain and Leonard, 1993). Special interests would no longer be able to take
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advantage of the rationally disinterested voter. It may be that this negative effect is
countering the other positive effect we discussed in the beginning.
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CLOSING

In this paper I have discussed the theoretical benefits and costs of compulsory
voting, the most important of these the fear that it would unfairly benefit more left
leaning parties. I then did a review on why these critics may have some theoretical
support for their claim. After that I presented my findings that show there is no
significant relationship between compulsory voting laws and government spending. I
then presented you with several reasons why I believe that the output may not be
presenting the total truth. The complexity of such a macroeconomic regression has most
likely hindered its ability to represent reality. Problematic variables like definitions of
welfare, political culture, institutional and structural competitiveness, and even the
selection effect for why each of these countries initially chose the law were all
challenging to measure. The controversy over compulsory voting’s affect on government
spending is far from over, but I believe this paper has been valuable piece on the subject.
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APPENDIX

tax_revenue = most recent data on the amount of tax revenue as a % of GDP
compulsory_voting _degree = 0 if there was no law, .33 if the law was not enforced, .66
if there was weak enforcement, and 1 if it was strictly enforced
gdp_pc = GDP per capita
islamic_dummy = value of 1 if they are considered an Islamic nation by the
Organization of The Islamic Conference, 0 if they were not
population = population in millions
pop_urban = percentage of the population located in urban areas in 2005
soviet_dummy = value of 1 if they were a member of the former Soviet Union, 0 if they
were not
subsaharan_dummy = value of 1 if they were, 0 if they were not
voter_turnout = (vote/VAP%), the number of possible voters divided by the number
who actually voted
turnout_law = interaction variable consisting of the voter_turnout variable multiplied by
the compulsory_voting_degree variable
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